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Abstract
Uncertainty about the importance of influenza transmission by airborne droplet nuclei gener-
ates controversy for infection control. Human challenge-transmission studies have been
supported as the most promising approach to fill this knowledge gap. Healthy, seronegative
volunteer ‘Donors’ (n = 52) were randomly selected for intranasal challenge with influenza
A/Wisconsin/67/2005 (H3N2). ‘Recipients’ randomized to Intervention (IR, n = 40) or Control
(CR, n = 35) groups were exposed to Donors for four days. IRs wore face shields and hand
sanitized frequently to limit large droplet and contact transmission. One transmitted infection
was confirmed by serology in a CR, yielding a secondary attack rate of 2.9% among CR, 0%
in IR (p = 0.47 for group difference), and 1.3% overall, significantly less than 16% (p<0.001)
expected based on a proof-of-concept study secondary attack rate and considering that
there were twice as many Donors and days of exposure. The main difference between
these studies was mechanical building ventilation in the follow-on study, suggesting a possi-
ble role for aerosols.
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Author summary
Understanding the relative importance of influenza modes of transmission informs strate-
gic use of preventive measures to reduce influenza risk in high-risk settings such as hospi-
tals and is important for pandemic preparedness. Given the increasing evidence from
epidemiological modelling, exhaled viral aerosol, and aerobiological survival studies sup-
porting a role for airborne transmission and the potential benefit of respirators (and other
precautions designed to prevent inhalation of aerosols) versus surgical masks (mainly
effective for reducing exposure to large droplets) to protect healthcare workers, more
studies are needed to evaluate the extent of risk posed airborne versus contact and large
droplet spray transmission modes. New human challenge-transmission studies should be
carefully designed to overcome limitations encountered in the current study. The low sec-
ondary attack rate reported herein also suggests that the current challenge-transmission
model may no longer be a more promising approach to resolving questions about trans-
mission modes than community-based studies employing environmental monitoring and
newer, state-of-the-art deep sequencing-based molecular epidemiological methods.
Introduction
Influenza virus is a pathogen of global health significance, but human-to-human transmission
remains poorly understood. In particular, the relative importance of the different modes of
transmission (direct and indirect contact, large droplet, and aerosols (airborne droplet nuclei))
remains uncertain during symptomatic and asymptomatic infection [1–4].
The evidence base for influenza transmission is derived from studies that have assessed:
virus deposition and survival in the environment; the epidemiology of disease; pharmaceutical
and non-pharmaceutical interventions; animal models; and mathematical models of transmis-
sion. Those approaches have yet to produce conclusive data quantifying the relative impor-
tance of human-human transmission modes [1,2].
Infection control guidance for pandemic and seasonal influenza assumes that most trans-
mission occurs during symptomatic infection, predominantly via large droplet spread at short
range (1-2m) [1]. Thus, social distancing measures are often proposed to mitigate the spread
and impact of a pandemic; and hand washing and respiratory etiquette are promoted to reduce
transmission. Evidence to support the possibility of aerosol transmission has grown over
recent years [5–7]. and leads to controversies about when and if filtering facepiece respirators
(and other precautions designed to prevent inhalation of aerosols) versus surgical masks
(mainly capable of reducing large droplets and some fine particles) should be used to protect
healthcare workers, particularly during a severe pandemic [1,3,4,8–10].
An expert panel, after in-depth review of the challenges facing community- and workplace-
based intervention studies and their failure thus far to provide definitive evidence regarding
the relative contribution of the various modes, concluded that a human challenge-transmis-
sion study would be a more promising direction for future research [11]. Influenza challenge
studies in humans have been conducted to investigate disease pathogenesis and the efficacy of
antivirals and vaccines. Challenge studies assessing human-to-human transmission had not
been performed [11]. In 2009, we demonstrated proof-of-concept that healthy seronegative
volunteers inoculated intranasally with influenza A/Wisconsin/67/2005 (A/WI), an H3N2
virus, would develop symptoms of influenza-like illness (ILI) and, under two days of house-
hold-like conditions without environmental controls, transmit infection to other seronegative
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volunteers. This suggested that larger scale human challenge-transmission models might be
useful to evaluate transmission modes. A subsequent international workshop discussed the
potential that human challenge-transmission studies, with appropriate interventions, monitor-
ing of aerosol shedding, and environmental controls, could provide definitive results [12].
Here, we report a large follow-on study, including design factors (Fig 1) aimed at assessing the
importance of aerosol transmission in human-to-human transmission of influenza virus.
Although the study did not achieve the intended level of transmission required for a more con-
clusive interpretation, it has revealed important lessons about potential airborne transmission
and study design that represent critical knowledge to support effective large-scale, costly stud-
ies in this area.
Results
Participation and safety
Between January and June 2013, 496 seronegative (HAI�10 to the challenge virus antigen) vol-
unteers underwent study-specific screening and 166 entered the quarantine unit, of whom 127
proved suitable for final study entry (Fig 2 –trial profile; S5 Text–volunteer baseline character-
istics). Thirty-nine subjects were discharged before inoculation or exposure per protocol as
described in Methods. Three separate quarantine EEs (exposure events) took place in March,
April, and June 2013 involving Q1: 41 (20 Donors; 11 CR; 10 IR), Q2: 31 (12 Donors; 9 CR; 10
IR) and Q3: 55 (20 Donors; 15 CR; 20 IR) subjects respectively, with 4 Donors and 4 to 7
Recipients per exposure group. No serious adverse events were recorded in volunteers who
commenced the study.
Fig 1. Schematic of study design showing timelines, environmental controls and monitoring, physical segregation arrangements, exposure intervention, and
volunteer movements during quarantine study. DFA: direct fluorescence assay; RH: relative humidity; NPS: nasopharyngeal swab.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008704.g001
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Environmental control
In Q1 relative humidity averaged 40% (Standard Deviation 9%), room temperature averaged
20.2 oC (0.4 oC) and CO2 concentration averaged 1430ppm (110ppm). For Q2 and Q3, respec-
tively, the corresponding values were 44% (4%), 21.4˚C (0.3 oC), 1810ppm (160ppm), and 57%
(4%), 21.4˚C (0.3 oC), 1810ppm (160ppm). Outdoor CO2 concentration proxies, taken from
the average of CO2 measurements during 2:00am-3:00am were 418, 435, and 422 ppm, for Q1,
Q2, and Q3, respectively.
Donor status
Donor status is summarised by quarantine study in Table 1. Over all quarantines combined,
intranasal inoculation produced an infection rate of 81% (42/52) among inoculated volunteers.
Of the 42 lab-confirmed infected Donors 25 (60%) had ILI and 10 (24%) were classified as
asymptomatic (4 in Q1, 4 in Q2, and 2 in Q3).
Ten Donors had greater immunity on admission, as identified by samples collected on day
-2 (HAI>10 or MN�80), than at their earlier screening. Four of the 10 seroconverted (i.e. had
a 4-fold rise in HAI or MN titres) between admission to quarantine and follow-up. Five of the
Fig 2. Trial profile. Intervention Recipients: wore face shields, used hand sanitizer every 15 min and only allowed to
touch face with single-use wooden spatula; Control Recipients: did not use face shields or the specified hand hygiene
protocol.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008704.g002
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10 met laboratory case definition by qRT-PCR including all four who seroconverted. The one
additional qRT-PCR positive Donor had positive swabs on study days 2 and 3 in Q2.
Virus shedding by donors
Overall, 36 Donors had nasopharyngeal swab (NPS) that tested positive by PCR for A/WI. Of
these 36: 53% (n = 19) were positive on day 1 post-challenge; 94% (34) on day 2; 97% (35) on
day 3; 86% (31) on day 4; 92% (33) on day 5; and 67% (24) on day 6 (Fig 3).
Aerosol shedding was determined for 25 Donors on day 1, 31 on day 2, 30 on day 3, and 24
on day 4, and for a total of 36 person-days in Q1, 34 person-days in Q2, and 40 person-days in
Q3. Aerosol shedding from infected Donors, detected in Gesundheit-II samples, is summa-
rised in Table 2. Six (7%) of the coarse and 14 (16%) of the fine aerosol samples had detectable
viral RNA. We observed aerosol shedding from 11 (26%) of the 42 successfully infected
Donors. The geometric mean (GM) and geometric standard deviation (GSD) for coarse and
fine aerosol viral RNA copy numbers per 30-min sample were 3.1E+3 (3.3) and 5.3E+3 (4.6),
respectively. The maximum levels of shedding into coarse and fine aerosols were 2.79E+4 and
8.02E+4 RNA copies, respectively (Fig 3).
Recipient status
Recipient status is shown in Table 3. There were similar rates of symptoms in both IR and CR
groups, although more in the CR group met the study definition of ILI, the rates were not sig-
nificantly different (p = 0.23); no Recipient developed fever. One infection was confirmed by
serology (HAI increased from�10 to 40 and MN increased from 10 to 320) in a CR subject
who was symptomatic and whose symptoms met the definition of ILI, but whose qRT-PCR
evaluations were persistently negative. Two other CR were transiently qRT-PCR positive but
neither met laboratory positivity criteria (S6 Text). Both were asymptomatic and had no
change from baseline serology. Thus, there was only one, confirmed transmission event. The
CR and IR group SARs (2.9% and 0%) were not significantly different (p = 0.47).
To compare these results with the SAR from the proof-of-concept study, we recomputed
the latter results using the current, more stringent outcome criteria. The adjusted proof-of-
concept SAR was 8.3% giving an expected SAR of 16%. The observed SAR for the current
study was not significantly different than that of the adjusted SAR from the proof-of-concept
study, but was significantly lower than the expected doubling of the SAR (1.3% overall,
p<0.0001; and 2.9% for CR, p = 0.035). Comparisons of observed and expected SAR using the
proof-of-concept study outcome definitions were also statistically significant (p<0.0001, S6
Text).
Table 1. Infected donor status.
Clinical Illness
n (% of Infected)
Laboratory-confirmed Infection
n (% of Infected)
Q� Infected/Inoculated n/n (%) Symptomatic Febrile ILI PCR-confirmed PCR-confirmed & Seroconversion Seroconversion by HAI: MN: Either
1 15/20 (75) 11 (73) 4 (27) 8 (53) 12 (80) 11 (73) 12: 14: 14
2 11/12 (92) 7 (64) 0 (0) 5 (45) 10 (91) 8 (73) 9: 7: 9
3 16/20 (80) 14 (88) 2 (13) 12 (75) 14 (88) 12 (75) 14: 11: 14
All 42/52 (81) 32 (76) 6 (14) 25 (60) 36 (86) 31 (74) 35: 32: 37
�Quarantine number; Ten Donors had greater than anticipated pre-challenge immunity: 4 in Q1, 2 in Q2, 4 in Q3.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008704.t001
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Fig 3. Viral detection in Donors by day of exposure event. A) Columns show the proportion of all infected donors (n = 42) who were qRT-PCR positive for viral
shedding for coarse (>5μm) and fine (�5μm) aerosols, and nasopharyngeal swabs. B) Mean and standard deviation error bars for qRT-PCR cycle threshold values from
the positive nasopharyngeal swabs (n = 19 on day 1; n = 34 on day 2; n = 35 on day 3; n = 31 on day 4). C) Virus quantified (log10 RNA copies) from detectable exhaled
coarse (n = 6) and fine (n = 14) breath aerosols by qRT-PCR; the boxes show the inner-quartile range (IQR) with a band to indicate the median, and whiskers extending to
highest and lowest data points within 1.5 IQR.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008704.g003
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Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the largest human influenza challenge-transmission study under-
taken to date. We applied measures to control and standardise environmental conditions and
ventilation rates within and between exposure events, to emulate as far as possible indoor win-
ter conditions when respiratory virus spread is maximal. We particularly sought to maintain
low humidity conditions which have been associated with enhanced transmission [13] and
increased virus viability [14], together with a low ventilation rate to maximize recipient expo-
sure to airborne virus. The near absence of transmission to control Recipients suggests contact
and large droplet spray did not contribute substantially to transmission under the conditions
used in these EEs. The significantly lower than expected SAR in this study compared with the
proof-of-concept study, which had much lower ventilation rates, suggests aerosols as an
important mode of influenza virus transmission in this model. The overall low SAR suggests
that Donors in this model were minimally contagious and prevents definitive assessment of
the modes of transmission.
Having reported an SAR of 25% (3/12) in our earlier proof-of-concept study, we expected
to observe an SAR of>25%, having doubled both the duration of the exposure and the num-
ber of Donors in each quarantine [15]. Indeed, the study was designed to examine an SAR of
Table 2. Exhaled breath viral RNA detection and copy number among infected donors by quarantine event and aerosol fraction.
Coarse Aerosol (>5μm) Fine Aerosol (�5μm)












1 15 27 1 (7) 1 (4) 2.79e+04 3 (20) 5 (19) 3.32e+04
2 11 30 3 (27) 3 (10) 2.16e+03 3 (27) 4 (13) 1.80e+04
3 16 32 2 (13) 2 (6) 1.73e+03 5 (31) 5 (16) 1.70e+03
All 42 89 6 (14) 6 (7) 6.31e+03 11 (26) 14 (16) 1.76e+04
�Quarantine number
†The arithmetic mean RNA copy number used positive samples only; The geometric means (GM) and geometric standard deviations (GSD) over all positive samples
were 3.14E+3 (3.33) and 5.31E+3 (4.59) for coarse and fine aerosol samples, respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008704.t002
Table 3. Recipient status.
Clinical Illness
n (% of Exposed)
Laboratory-confirmed Infection
n (% of Exposed)
Q� Recipient† Infected/Exposed n/n (%) Symptomatic Febrile ILI PCR-confirmed PCR-confirmed & Seroconversion Seroconversion by
HAI: MN: Either
1 CR 0/11 (0) 4 (36) 0 (0) 3 (27) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0: 0: 0
IR 0/10 (0) 2 (20) 0 (0) 1 (10) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0: 0: 0
2 CR 1/9 (11) 2 (22) 0 (0) 2 (22) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1: 1: 1
IR 0/10 (0) 3 (30) 0 (0) 2 (20) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0: 0: 0
3 CR 0/15 (0) 6 (40) 0 (0) 4 (27) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0: 0: 0
IR 0/20 (0) 6 (30) 0 (0) 2 (10) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0: 0: 0
All CR 1/35 (3) 12 (34) 0 (0) 9 (26) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1: 1: 1
IR 0/40 (0) 11 (28) 0 (0) 5 (13) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0: 0: 0
�Quarantine number; Eleven recipients had greater than anticipated pre-challenge immunity: 3 CR and 3 IR for Q1; no Q2 Recipients; 3 CR and 2 IR for Q3. None
seroconverted.
†CR: Control Recipient; IR: Intervention Recipient.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008704.t003
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40% in CR versus 20% in IR which would have required 125 Recipient volunteers; this was not
met (n = 75) and the study was underpowered.
However, the outcome criteria used in the proof-of-concept study, which included as posi-
tive a single NPS positive by qRT-PCR without seroconversion, were made more stringent in
the present study by requiring two or more NPS positive by qRT-PCR in the absence of sero-
conversion (S6 Text). Applying the proof-of-concept criteria to the current study gives an SAR
of 4% (3/75) overall, while applying the stricter criteria used in this study to the proof-of-con-
cept study gives an SAR of 8.3% (1/12) rather than 25%. Given the lower than planned enrol-
ment and the stricter outcome criteria, this study was doubly underpowered.
These observations raise two questions: 1) Why were SARs, using stringent criteria, low in
both studies and what are the implications for future human challenge-transmission studies?
2) Why was the SAR significantly lower in the present study compared with the expected dou-
bling of the rate observed for the proof-of-concept?
The low SAR in these studies suggests that, unless a much greater SAR can be achieved,
type II error associated with underpowering will be a major obstacle to successful use of
human challenge-transmission studies. Potential areas to consider addressing in order to raise
the SARs in future studies include the virus used, the route of inoculation, susceptibility of the
human volunteers, the rate of viral shedding into NPS and aerosols, and reducing ventilation
of exposure rooms.
In the proof-of-concept (2009) and follow-on (2013) studies we used a GMP A/WI chal-
lenge virus manufactured by Baxter BioScience (Vienna, Austria). Both studies produced simi-
lar clinical and serological infection rates (typically 60–70% and 70–75%, respectively) after
inoculation via nasal instillation, and similar spectrums of clinical illness severity in Donors.
These rates were higher than reported by a previous study using lower doses of the same viral
preparation [16] and consistent with rates reported in a review of 56 challenge studies [17].
The illnesses we observed were similar to the range seen in healthy adults in the community,
from asymptomatic to febrile symptomatic infection [18]. Thus, skewed illness severity does
not seem to explain the low SAR.
The virus preparation has been used in other human challenge studies with similar rates of
infection via nasal instillation [19]. Using deep sequencing, Sobel Leonard and colleagues
showed that a sample of the Baxter stock “was at least partially adapted” to the egg and/or tis-
sue environments in which it was produced [19]. They also found that nasal instillation of the
stock into human volunteers resulted in rapid purification selection, although a fixed variant
in the HA gene remained. We have performed a BLAST search and identified the fixed variant
(G70A/D8N) in deposited sequences of wild-type H3N2 viruses. This suggests that, on its
own, the fixed HA variant is unlikely to have been a key alteration. These results suggest that it
is unlikely that the virus stock was the primary cause of the low SARs. But, the impact of posi-
tive selection of the challenge virus for growth in the production environment, rather than for
human transmissibility, remains a potential contributing factor to consider in choosing chal-
lenge viruses for future transmission studies.
The route of infection with influenza virus is known to matter in the setting of experimental
infection, with aerosolized virus infectious at lower doses and more likely to result in ‘typical
influenza-like disease’ (fever plus cough) than intranasal inoculation [20,21]. This anisotropic
property [22] of influenza virus is not unique among respiratory viruses; e.g. it is exploited by
the live, unattenuated adenovirus vaccine [23]. The implication for human challenge-transmis-
sion studies, however, may be that increased rates of lower respiratory tract infection via aero-
sol inoculation might be required to achieve sufficiently high rates of donors with fever, cough,
and contagiousness to achieve a useful SAR.
PLOS PATHOGENS Human influenza A transmission model in a controlled environment
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In the current quarantine-based human challenge-transmission model, consistent with his-
torical precedent, screening for susceptibility was undertaken primarily by HAI antibody
screening, although it is recognised that screening by MN titre or other assays [24,25] could be
an alternative or adjunctive approach. The exact correlates of immunity and severity using
novel immunological assays have not been validated and selecting subjects based on these
assays would have added substantial complexity and costs. Six Donors and five Recipients in
the present study were discovered, in retrospect, to have seroconverted during the 3 to 56-day
interval prior to entering the quarantine facility, despite having as short a delay as possible
between final screening for HAI and quarantine entry. However, the majority of Donors and
Recipients were susceptible according to the results of microneutralization tests. Prior immu-
nity, as measured by the HAI and MN assays, does not therefore, appear to have been a major
limitation nor account for failure to transmit from readily infected Donors to identically
screened Recipients. Regarding future studies, as novel immune correlates of influenza protec-
tion and severity become established, additional approaches beyond HAI and MN assays
could be employed for volunteer selection. This might enable selection of those likely to
become infected, febrile, and have greater symptomatology including more frequent and
greater levels of cough and runny nose. Unfortunately, such screening might also dramatically
reduce the yield of suitable volunteers and substantially increase overall study costs.
Results from serial nasopharyngeal swabs in Donors indicate that over 80% were positive
by qRT-PCR testing on one or more post-challenge days. Viral load detected by swabs was
substantial with qRT-PCR Ct values in the mid 20s on days two and three (Fig 3). Thus, failure
to shed virus into nasal secretions cannot explain the low SARs. Minimal transmission despite
days of prolonged exposure to Donors shedding virus into nasal secretions provides strong evi-
dence that contact and large droplet transmission are not important in this model.
The results from breath sampling with the Gesundheit-II device indicate that 26% (11/42)
of infected Donors had virus detectable in exhaled air during the same period. By comparison,
virus shedding into exhaled breath was detected in 84% (119 of 142) of influenza cases selected
on the basis of having fever or a positive rapid test and sampled on one to three days post
onset of symptoms, mostly recruited from young adults on a college campus [7]. When com-
pared on a per-sample basis, infected Donors shed detectable virus less frequently than natu-
rally infected college campus cases [7] in both coarse (7% and 40%, respectively) and fine
aerosols (15% and 76%); all assays for both groups were performed in the same laboratory
using the same methods. However, when the comparison was limited to positive aerosol sam-
ples from each study population, the average quantities of virus detected were similar (within 1
log), for the Donors as for the college community cases (GM coarse 3.1E+3 and 1.2E+4, GM
fine 5.3E+3 and 3.8E+4, respectively). The maximum exhaled breath viral aerosol from the 11
Donors was two to four logs lower than from the college campus cases selected for having
fever or a high viral load in the NPS (maximum coarse 2.8E+4 and 4.3E+8, and maximum fine
8.0E+4 and 4.4E+7, respectively) [7]. While this difference may merely represent the low prob-
ability of sampling from the tail of a log-normal distribution with only 11, as compared with
119 cases, it may be relevant to the low SAR in the challenge-transmission model if aerosols
disseminated by more symptomatic individuals, such as the selected community cases, and
rare supershedders account for most transmission. If aerosols are largely derived from the
lower respiratory tract, as has been suggested by analysis of the college community cases, this
would also suggest that future challenge-transmission studies should employ methods
designed to increase the frequency of lower respiratory tract infection.
The proof-of-concept study was conducted in a hotel room with closed windows and ther-
mal control provided only by a recirculating air conditioning unit. While the ventilation rate
was not measured, it was likely to have been extremely low for the number of occupants, with
PLOS PATHOGENS Human influenza A transmission model in a controlled environment
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only small, intermittent, bathroom extract and natural building infiltration providing fresh air.
The ventilation rate of 4 l/s/person during the main study was low compared to 10 l/s/person
recommended in UK design standards [26] but was likely substantially greater than in the
proof-of-concept study. This would have produced significantly higher viral aerosol concen-
trations during the proof-of-concept EEs, assuming similar generation rates from Donors in
both experiments. Given that the Donors in the two studies were similar in other respects, dif-
ferences in shedding rates seem unlikely. Therefore, the difference in SAR between this study
and the expected SAR based on design changes and prior results are possibly due to differing
ventilation conditions. The implication for future challenge-transmission studies, given that
the ventilation rate in the current study was as low as possible with a single pass ventilation sys-
tem, is that recirculating air conditioning systems similar to that in the proof-of-concept study
should be employed to limit dilution ventilation and maximize exposure to aerosols. This will
be especially important if Donors in future studies continue to represent the lower end of the
aerosol shedding spectrum seen in naturally infected cases.
Achieving temperature and humidity to simulate winter conditions was challenging, par-
ticularly in Q3, conducted in June 2013 when the average external conditions were 16˚C
and 64% relative humidity. It was necessary to strike a balance between volunteer comfort
and conditions favourable to transmission, both of which were constrained by the capability
of the mechanical systems in the building. However, the relative humidity in the current
study overlapped with that during the proof-of-concept study, which ranged between 38
and 53%, and thus, eliminated humidity as a potential explanation for the difference in
transmission rates.
Despite this study not having produced the planned SAR, it yields important findings.
First, although fewer viral challenged subjects had virus-laden aerosols than seen in people
with natural infections presenting with influenza-like symptoms, those volunteers who did
produce viral aerosols did so at a rate similar to the average symptomatic naturally infected
case. Second, given that a subset of the infected volunteers had moderate viral aerosol shed-
ding in this model, observation of transmission via aerosols in quarantine studies may be
strongly dependent on the dilution ventilation rate. Third, low risk of transmission to Con-
trol Recipients suggests that contact and large droplet spray transmission were not impor-
tant modes of transmission in this model. The overall low SAR compared to that observed
in the proof-of-concept study suggests that, given the main difference between the studies
was the indoor air ventilation rate, aerosol transmission may be an important mode of influ-
enza virus transmission between adults. Finally, sensitivity of transmission to details of the
Donors selected, environment, and activity during exposure events, suggest that if a suc-
cessful transmission model can be developed, carefully designed studies may be useful for
investigating specific, targeted intervention strategies for prevention of specific transmis-
sion modalities. However, sensitivity to experimental conditions also demonstrates that it
will be challenging to generalize the results of the quarantine-based transmission model to
broad conclusions about the relative importance of aerosol, droplet spray, and contact
modes of transmission. These complexities of the challenge-transmission model suggest
that community-based transmission studies employing deep-sequencing based molecular
epidemiologic methods in natural experiments, e.g. comparing high and low ventilation
dormitories or barracks, may be more attractive alternatives than previously thought.
Unfortunately, although an important role for aerosols in transmission of influenza, at least
between adults, is hinted at when comparing the proof-of-concept and current studies, this
challenge model cannot provide a definitive answer to the importance of this mode for
influenza virus transmission between humans.
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Materials and methods
Ethics statement
The randomized challenge-transmission trial took place from March to June 2013 in a closed
quarantine facility, with written informed consent from healthy volunteers in accordance with
the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki, in compliance with UK regulatory and ethical
(IRB) requirements (under auspices of the UK Health Research Authority (HRA) National
Research Ethics Service (NRES) Committee London–City & East; reference number 12/LO/
1277), and registered with ClinicalTrials.gov (number NCT01710111). The role of the funding
source is described in S2 Text.
Overview
Volunteers, screened for serologic susceptibility, were randomly selected for intranasal chal-
lenge with A/WI [15]–becoming ‘Donors’. After allowing for a short incubation period,
Donors were introduced to other sero-susceptible volunteers–‘Recipients’–under controlled
household-like conditions for four days. Recipients were randomised as Intervention Recipi-
ents (IR) or Control Recipients (CR). IRs wore face shields evaluated to interrupt large droplet
transmission but to be permissive to aerosols (S3 Text); in addition, IRs hand sanitised (using
alcohol-based Deb InstantFOAM, 72% ethyl alcohol) once every 15 minutes to minimise the
possibility of contact transmission. IRs were only allowed to touch face via single-use wooden
spatulas. Thus, IRs would be exposed to influenza only via aerosols. CRs did not wear face
shields or use hand sanitiser and were allowed to touch face freely; therefore, CRs would have
been exposed via all routes of transmission consistent with close proximity human-human
contact. Fig 1 shows an overview of the study design.
Influenza virus
Influenza A/WI manufactured and processed under current good manufacturing practices
(cGMP) was obtained from Baxter BioScience, (Vienna, Austria). Stocks of this virus prepara-
tion have been sequenced and its evolution in the upper respiratory track of inoculated volun-
teers extensively analysed [19].
Screening
Volunteers were screened from 3–56 days in advance of the experiment to determine humoral
immunity to A/WI before undergoing further screening against inclusion and exclusion crite-
ria (S4 Text). Volunteers needed to be healthy, between the ages of 18 and 45 years, not living
with anyone deemed at high risk of influenza complications on discharge, and not to have had
a seasonal influenza vaccine in the last 3 years. Blood samples from volunteers were collected
immediately before quarantine entry for repeat serology, although results were not available
until after the study. An initial screening haemagglutination inhibition assay (HAI) titre of
�10 was considered evidence of susceptibility to infection.
Power calculation
We calculated, based on the reported SAR of the proof-of-concept study [15] (S4 Text), that
over a range of scenarios the statistical power of the whole study would be 63%-84%, typically
80% in the most realistic scenario, if a sample size of 125 Recipients was achieved (70 IR, 55
CR). To increase the SAR from that observed in the proof-of-concept study, we opted to inoc-
ulate 4 (rather than 2) Donors per 5 Recipients and to conduct exposure events on days 1–4
(rather than 2–3) post inoculation.
PLOS PATHOGENS Human influenza A transmission model in a controlled environment
PLOS Pathogens | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1008704 July 13, 2020 11 / 16
Pre-exposure
Screened, eligible, volunteers entered a closed, quarantine unit on Day -2 and were rando-
mised to Donor or Recipient (IR and CR) groups; thereafter Donors and Recipients were seg-
regated. Donors and Recipients were immediately screened for a panel of 7 imported
‘contaminant’ respiratory viruses (influenza A, B; adenovirus; respiratory syncytial virus; para-
influenza 1, 2, 3) by a direct fluorescence antibody assay (DFA) (LIGHT DIAGNOSTICS
SimulFluor1 Respiratory Screen, Merck Millipore) and any with a positive test were immedi-
ately discharged. On day 0, Donors were inoculated intranasally, via pipette in a supine posi-
tion, with 0.5ml per nostril of a suspension containing 5.5 log10TCID50/ml of influenza A/WI
[16,27].
Exposure events
The study was conducted in three, separate, identically-designed quarantine events (Q1, Q2,
and Q3). From Day 1 to Day 4 of each quarantine event, all volunteers took part in an Expo-
sure Event (EE). Individual Donors and Recipients were each allocated to a single exposure
room per day where they interacted at close distances for approximately 15 hours/day, for four
consecutive days. In-room staff supervised activities such as playing board games, pool, and
table football, and watching films, whilst ensuring that volunteers mixed freely, and that IRs
complied with face shield use, hand sanitisation, and no-touch-face rules. Donor, IR and CR
groups were moved into different corners of the rooms for meal breaks, and Donor and Recip-
ient groups were housed separately at night, including further separation and withdrawal of
any Recipients with symptoms to prevent any contamination of the results by Recipient-Recip-
ient secondary transmission. Five exposure rooms were used ranging from 17-30m2 floor area
and 50-87m3 volume. Four Donors were non-randomly allocated to each exposure group to
ensure even distribution of subjects actively shedding virus. This was achieved by assessing
symptom scores and the results of influenza rapid tests (Quidel Sofia) performed on Days 1
and 2. From Day 2 onwards, Donors remained in their allocated group and were not redistrib-
uted further. Once assigned to an exposure group, Recipients remained in the same group
until the end of the EE or until they developed ILI and were withdrawn to a separate isolation
area. On each day of EE, each exposure group rotated to a different exposure room.
Environmental controls
Each exposure room was assessed pre-quarantine by building and ventilation engineers and
modified to achieve a ventilation rate of approximately 4L/second/person (based on planned
occupancy during EEs), temperature 18–22˚C, and relative humidity 45–65%, to produce con-
ditions favourable to influenza transmission [13], balanced against tolerability for occupants,
and the capability of building systems to provide controlled environments comparable across
all three quarantine studies. During each EE, rooms were monitored at 5-minute intervals for
CO2 concentration (as a proxy for ventilation rate), temperature and humidity; heating, cool-
ing and humidity were remotely adjusted to maintain optimal conditions.
Clinical assessment
All subjects underwent thrice daily monitoring of respiratory and systemic symptoms; each
symptom was reported as grade 0 (not present) to 3 (severe). Paired venous blood specimens
for serology were taken on Day -2 and Day 28. NPS were taken daily from all subjects. Respira-
tory specimens were analysed by quantitative reverse-transcriptase PCR (qRT-PCR) and sero-
logical specimens by HAI and microneutralisation (MN) assays. The qRT-PCR and HAI were
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performed in duplicate at the MRC University of Glasgow Centre for Virus Research (with
Fast Track Diagnostics qRT-PCR kit) and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), Atlanta; MN assays were performed by CDC as described previously [28].
Exhaled breath sampling
Donors were assigned to provide exhaled breath samples on two, randomly selected days
within the exposure event, collected using a Gesundheit-II cone collection apparatus allowing
for fractionation of particle sizes into ‘fine’ <5μm and ‘coarse’�5μm aerosol samples [8,29].
Each sample collection session lasted for 30 minutes. Breath samples were concentrated,
extracted, stored at -80˚C, and evaluated by qRT-PCR using protocols and materials specified
by the CDC with RNA copy number estimated as previously described [7].
Discharge
After completion of the EE, Donors were discharged on active treatment with oseltamivir
(75mg b.i.d. 5 days), whereas Recipients were observed for 7 days, then discharged with oselta-
mivir on day 8. All volunteers attended for 28-day (+/-3 days) post virus exposure outpatient
follow-up and study dismissal.
Outcome definitions
Respiratory symptoms were defined as self-reported grade�1 of runny nose, stuffy nose,
sneeze, sore throat, cough, or shortness of breath ‘lasting�24 hours’ (S4 Text). Fever was
defined as temperature >37.9 oC. Symptomatic was defined as evidence of any respiratory
symptom lasting�24 hours during study days 1–6. Influenza-like Illness (ILI) was defined as
an illness>24 hours duration with: either fever and at least one respiratory symptom; or two
or more symptoms of grade�1, one of which must have been respiratory; eligible non-respira-
tory symptoms were headache, muscle/joint ache, and malaise; lasting�24 hours means
report of a respiratory symptom during 3/3 observations within a single day, or at least once
per day over two consecutive days. Laboratory confirmed infection was defined as: a 4-fold or
greater rise in HAI or MN titres between Day -2 (baseline) and Day 28; or two or more positive
NPS test results by qRT-PCR. These differed from the proof-of-concept study, which used
seroconversion or a single positive nasal wash (S6 Text).
Statistics
Comparisons were made between groups using Fisher’s exact tests for binomial proportions
and between observed and expected outcomes using binomial tests. Tests were two-tailed. All
data to reproduce analyses is available from the EMIT Consortium upon request.
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